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ABSTRACT
Victims of romance fraud experience both a financial and emotional burden. Although multiple 
studies have offered insight into the correlates of perpetration and victimization, no known study has 
examined if, and how, romance fraud can be curtailed. The current study uses a randomized 
experimental design to test the restrictive deterrent effect of warning messages sent to romance 
fraudsters via email. We find that active romance fraudsters who receive a deterrence message, 
instead of non-deterrence messages, respond at a lower rate; and, among those who respond, use 
fewer words and have a lower probability of seeking reply without denying wrongdoing. The results 
provide support for restrictive deterrence in cyberspace. Theoretical and policy implications are 
discussed.  
INTRODUCTION
The internet provides myriad opportunities for people to commit crimes (Bossler & Berenblum, 
2019). One type of crime is fraud, defined as an act in which the facts of exchange do not match the 
communication surrounding it (Jacques & Wright, 2008). Online fraud is the most frequently reported 
cybercrime, with the highest associated monetary loss (Internet Crime Report, 2019). Various forms of 
online fraud exist, including, but not limited to, business email compromise, phishing/spoofing, and 
advanced fee payment fraud (Internet Crime Report, 2019).
In this article, our focus is romance fraud. Romance fraud, compared to other form of fraud, is 
relatively new, and have a unique emotional component. They involve “cybercriminals pretending to 
initiate a relationship through online dating sites and then defrauding their victims of a large sum of 
money” (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). This relationship can be sought via email or on a variety of 
websites and “apps,” such as those specific to dating or more general (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, Google Hangout) (Federal Trade Commission, 2019). Many romance fraudsters are 
motivated by money, with the goal being to increase income from victims (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). 
The frequency and seriousness of romance fraud are on the rise. Victim-reports surged from roughly 
six thousand in 2014 to more than nineteen thousand in 2019 (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2019). 
For the same years, the annual loss increased from $87 million to around $475 million (Internet Crime 
Complaint Center, 2019). In 2019, the average loss was around $24,000, which is three times higher 
than other types of fraud (Internet Crime Report, 2019). The harm is not only financial. Victims also 
experience psychological distress upon learning that their relationship was never real, and that they 
fell for a scam that cost them money (see Whitty & Buchanan, 2016).
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Despite the numbers, scant attention has been given to this phenomenon in the criminological 
literature (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014), and the majority of these studies employ a qualitative approach. 
Whitty and colleagues (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012; Sorell & Whitty, 2019; Whitty, 2018; Whitty 2015) 
have been instrumental in bringing attention to romance scams. They introduced a formal definition; 
highlight the scale and scope of the phenomenon; explore the scam’s anatomy; present psychological 
characteristics of offenders and victims; and, describe the obstacles and aids associated with helping 
victims (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012, 2016; Sorell & Whitty, 2019; Whitty, 2018; 
Whitty 2015, 2018).
A few attempts have been made to better understand romance fraud using quantitative approach. For 
example, Whitty and Futter (2019) asked a sample of 261 participants with experience on dating sites 
and/or social networking sites to distinguish between 20 genuine dating profiles and 20 known 
scammer profiles. They found that correct judgements were often made by participants who scored 
lower in romantic beliefs, higher in impulsivity, higher in considerations for future consequences, and 
had previously seen romance scams (Whitty & Futter, 2019). Suarez-Tangil and colleagues (2019) 
investigated the archetype of online dating profiles to develop a system for automatically detecting 
this type of fraud. Also, they analyzed conversations between victims and romance scammers to 
determine potential linguistic hints for identifying the initiation of romance scams.
No known study of romance fraud uses criminological theory to explain its occurrence and 
curtailment. One such theory is restrictive deterrence (Gibbs, 1975), rooted in the rational choice 
paradigm (Cornish & Clark, 1986). As its name suggest, restrictive deterrence theory contends that 
when offenders perceive the threat of sanction, be it formal or informal, they would limit the 
frequency or seriousness of their offenses (Gibbs, 1975). The efficacy of this theory has been 
demonstrated in the physical world and in cyberspace, using qualitative and experimental research 
(Jacobs, 1996a; Maimon et.al, 2014).
In cyberspace, restrictive deterrence has been found to explain trespassing, which requires a higher 
level of technical expertise (Maimon et.al, 2014). Unclear is whether that will hold true for less 
technical forms of cybercrime, such as romance fraud. This article addresses that lacuna and another 
one: whether a potential victim’s style of communicating to a romance fraudster affects their response. 
Our method—a randomized experimental approach—overcomes a limitation of prior studies, namely 
the inability to make strong causal inferences. Before presenting and discussing our hypotheses, 
current study, and findings, we review the literature that informs this article.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Romance Fraud
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As characterized by Whitty (2015), romance scams have five distinct stages, though all may not occur in 
any given (attempted) romantic fraud. The first stage involves baiting victims: fraudsters tend to use 
bogus profile pictures with low quality and attractive figures. After successfully getting a response 
from their targets, fraudsters initiate the second stage, grooming: fraudsters try to increase the 
intimacy of relationship to the point that victims are willing to send money. The third stage is the sting: 
fraudsters attempt to get money from their victims, typically by sharing a crisis story (e.g., 
bankruptcy, death of a parent. The fourth stage is sexual abuse. Here, the fraudsters’ motivation is not 
money but to humiliate victims, ultimately, by asking them to perform sexual acts in front of a 
webcam. The last stage is the revelation: victims discover they have been defrauded and decide how to 
respond.
There is extensive research addressing the psychological influence that fraudsters, of all sorts, impose 
on potential victims. Rusch (2003) found that they majority of fraudsters use three main techniques to 
impact the beliefs and behaviors of their victims. Two of these techniques are pertinent to romance 
scams. One is a peripheral route of persuasion: romance fraudsters use statements intended to make 
potential victims susceptible to strong emotions (e.g., joy, fear), which interferes with their ability to 
engage in good decision-making (see also Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). The second technique is an 
appeal to authority: fraudsters increase their legitimacy (e.g., by claiming to work for an important 
organizations) and thereby more effectively persuade victims. Loewenbstein (1996) also provides 
insight into the psychology of romance frauds via the concept of “visceral influence.” This refers to 
factors that have “a direct hedonic impact” and “an effect on the relative desirability of different goods 
and actions” (p. 272). This concept is evident in that romance fraudsters create false identities that are 
very similar to those of targets. For example, they will claim to live in the same area as victims, prefer 
similar food, or belong to the same religion.
Restrictive Deterrence
Rooted in the concept of free will and utilitarian principles, the deterrence doctrine views people as 
rational. That is, they assess the benefits and costs of various lines of action, and do whichever is 
perceived to have the greatest utility (i.e., benefit minus costs). Deterrence theory is traced to classic 
works of crime and control, such as those of Hobbes (1968), Beccaria (1995), and Bentham (1789). It was 
on the verge of being discredited by social scientists, until reinvigorated by Becker (1968) and Gibbs 
(1968). Becker (1968) integrated economic/utility ideas into the criminal decision-making process. 
Gibbs (1968) provided an example of how to empirically test deterrence theory, namely by examining 
the relationship between the certainty and severity of punishments on individuals’ offending.
Gibbs (1975) went further by differentiating “absolute deterrence” from “restrictive deterrence.” The 
former refers to never committing a (particular) crime due to fear of sanction. Our focus is restrictive 
deterrence, or why offenders commit offenses in some situations but not others (see also Paternoster, 
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1989; Jacobs, 1996). Most research on restrictive deterrence is qualitative and focused on “analog” 
offenders and offenses, meaning those outside cyberspace. Example include drug dealers, burglars, 
auto thieves, carjackers, robbers and violent retaliators (e.g., Jacobs, 1993, 1996; Jacobs & Miller, 1998; 
Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014; Cherbonneau & Copes, 2006; Dickinson & Wright, 2015).  All of this 
research shows that offenders have ways to reduce the overall risk that, by their very nature, entail 
committing fewer offenses. In other words, that have a restrictive deterrent effect. 
A vein of deterrence research is concerned with warning messages. Geerken and Gove (1975) contend 
that warning messages are necessary and indispensable to preventing crime; and, for messages to be 
effective, they must be displayed to the target audience (Geerken & Goove, 1975). This idea harks back 
to Beccaria (1995), who wrote: “The more people understand the sacred code of the laws … the fewer 
will be crimes, for there is no doubt that ignorance and uncertainty of punishment” (p. 17).
Research testing the effect of warning messages shows mixed results. Some studies find that warning 
messages reduce offenses, such as theft (Solymosi et al., 2015), unsafe driving (Rama and Kulmala, 
2000), and insurance fraud (Blais and Bacher, 2007). Other studies find that warning messages can 
have no effect (Green, 1985; Lowman, 1992; Decker, 1972) or even the opposite effect (Snyder & Blood, 
1991; Grabosky, 1996).
For cybercrime, there is less research on warning messages as restrictive deterrents, but the findings 
point to a crime reduction effect. In a series of studies, Maimon and colleagues (Howell et al., 2017; 
Maimon et al., 2014; Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015) found that after hackers infiltrate a computer 
system, they reduce their illicit behavior post receipt of a warning message. That body of work uses 
“honeypots,” which are somewhat like (non-lethal) mouse or bug traps in which offenders are lured 
into a space to observe their behavior. Those studies are limited in that, one, they are focused on 
hacking and, two, that honeypot-based data suffer from notable limitations (Bossler, 2017). Moreover, 
they are not necessarily generalizable to other forms of cybercrime (Bossler, 2017). It is unknown 
whether similar results will be found for other cybercrimes other data collection techniques.
CURRENT STUDY
We examine whether deterrent messages sent to active romance fraudsters have a restrictive 
deterrent effect. To test the effect of deterrence messages on the initiation and extent of romance 
fraud, we formed two hypotheses and tested them with an experiment, described in the next section. 
We hypothesize: Romance fraudsters who receive a deterrence message, instead of non-deterrence 
messages, (H1) respond at a lower rate; and, (H2) among those who respond, use fewer words in their 
immediate responses. After testing those hypotheses, we turn to an exploratory analysis that uses 
mixed-methods to shed light on the manner of engagement by romance fraudsters. Based on our 
analysis of qualitative responses, we formed a third hypothesis for testing: (H3) Romance fraudsters 
CrimRxiv The Restrictive Deterrent E ect of Warning Messages Sent to Active Romance Fraudsters: An Experimental Approach
6
who receive and respond to a deterrence messages, instead of non-deterrence messages, have a lower 
probability of seeking a reply without denying wrongdoing.
METHOD
The following procedure was approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). An initial 
step in data collection was gathering a list of active romance fraudsters’ email addresses. We did so 
using a public online dating scam list, maintained by stop-scammers.com. This website uses victims’ 
reports to expose offenders and build awareness. Information on the site includes the offenders’ age, gender, 
address, email address, phone number, and social media information. This information is what 
offenders provide to their victim, so it represents their scamming identities, not necessarily their real 
ones. Note that the website only includes information for scammers who claim to be female.
The site has a rigorous vetting process. It requires victims to provide the administrators documented 
evidence of the attempted romance scam. We confirmed the validity of the site’s process by reporting a 
fictional romance fraud attempt to it, which was rejected due to sufficient evidence. Though anecdotal, 
the rejection of this fictional report, coupled with the website’s reputation, gives us confidence that the 
persons we messaged are in fact romance fraudsters. What we do not know is whether two or more 
email addresses are controlled by the same real individual. Yet for the sake of not writing in a pedantic 
and awkward language, we refer to each email address as a distinct individual/participant. 
Next, we used a python scraper to gather the email addresses of all romance fraudsters reported to 
the site in 2019, the most recent year of fully available data at the time of data collection. That is our 
temporal focus because we assume that those offenders, compared to those reported in prior years, 
are more likely to be active romance fraudsters (i.e., less likely to have desisted). That scrapping led us 
to obtain 546 unique email addresses. Our IRB prohibited us from gathering demographic information 
on the sample. That is not ideal, but not problematic given our focus and that the information has 
unknown validity (i.e., the reported traits may not match the offenders’ actual traits).
To ensure endogeneity, the 546 email addresses were randomly assigned into three groups, the names 
of which reflect the tone of our emails to them: deterrent group (N = 182); promising group (N = 175); 
and, ambiguous group (N = 189). The deterrent group received the message: “I know you are scamming 
innocent people. My friend was recently arrested for the same offense and is facing 5 years in prison. 
You should stop before you face the same fate.” The promising group was sent the message, “Hey, I 
saw your pictures. Can I send you money for a flight to visit me next week?” The ambiguous was sent a 
message that simply read “Hey.”
These messages were automatically sent on February 20, 2020, at the same time, using a program 
developed in Python. Not all fraudsters received the automated message. In the deterrent group, 43 
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messages failed to send; the promising group, 47 messages; in the ambiguous group, 51 messages. This 
reduced our sample of email addresses for analysis from a total of 546 to 405, with 139 in the deterrent 
group, 129 in the promising group, and 138 in the ambiguous group. After sending the messages, we 
gathered data for the 405 persons until the end of March 20, 2020.
Our independent variable is Deterrence, which is coded as a dichotomous variable. Those who received 
a deterrence message (i.e., individuals assigned to deterrent group) receive a score of 1; otherwise, 
received a score of 0. We created three unique dependent variables to assess our hypotheses. The first 
variable, Respond, is coded as 1 if  the fraudster responded to our message, and 0 if  not. The second 
variable, Words, is simply a count of the number of words included in the immediate responses sent to 
us by the romance fraudsters. The last variable, Seeking Reply Without Denial, is coded as 1 if  the 
person’s words are meant to generate a reply but do not deny wrongdoing; otherwise, as 0.
We analyze the data in a stepwise fashion. First, descriptive statistics are calculated. Then, to test 
our first hypothesis, we employ a chi-square test of independence, followed by a robustness test to 
validate our findings. Next, to test our second hypothesis, we employ an independent sample t-test. 
Also, we employ an Anova test followed by a Tukey Pairwise Comparison test to determine which pair 
of means differ. To test our third hypothesis, we again employ a chi-square test of independence, 
followed by an additional robustness test to validate our findings. We are able to employ these simple 
models without controls due to the randomized nature of our field experiment; it ensures group 
equality on all observed and unobserved variables.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Sixteen percent of  participants responded to our 
message. The average number of  words included in the response is 7.88, with a minimum of 0 
words (no response) and maximum of 529 words. Among those who replied to our messages, 78% 
percent sought a reply from us. Results demonstrate variability in our dependent variable of interest.
Hypothesis 1
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
To examine group differences in response probability, we conducted a chi-square test of 
independence. Results are presented in Table 2. Recall that our first hypothesis is that romance 
fraudsters who receive deterrence messages, instead of non-deterrence messages, will respond at a 
lower rate. Our findings support this hypothesis. There is significant difference in the response rate 
between those who received a deterrent message and those who received non-deterrent messages, x2 
= 7.04, p = 0.008. Romance fraudsters who received the deterrence message had a response rate of 9%, 
whereas that of persons who received the other messages was 20%. 
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[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
From the analysis presented in Table 2, it is unclear if the two non-deterrent messages skewed the 
results. Therefore, we separately examine each of the three groups using a chi-square test of 
independence. Results indicate there are significant differences in the response rate between the 
three groups, x2 = 8.03, p = 0.018. Whereas romance fraudsters who received the deterrent message 
only responded 9% of the time, those who were messaged “Hi” replied at a rate of 17%; those who were 
sent the promising message replied at a rate of 22%. Again, this finding supports our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Recall our second hypothesis is that among persons who respond to us, those who receive the 
deterrent message, instead of non-deterrence messages, will use fewer words in the immediate 
responses. We tested this hypothesis using an independent sample T-test. It examined the mean 
difference in the number of words used in the immediate responses to the deterrent and non-
deterrent messages. As presented in Table 4, we found that persons who were sent the deterrent 
message responded with 1.8 words on average, compared to 11 words among persons sent the non-
deterrent messages. This finding is in the anticipated direction, and marginally significant (t = 1.91, p = 
0.06), thus providing support for our second hypothesis.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Here too, however, that findings could be skewed by differences the groups who received the non-
deterrent messages. Therefore, we examined mean differences among the three groups using Anova. 
The results remain marginally significant, F = 2.65, p = 0.07. As presented in Table 5, we found that 
persons who were sent the deterrent message responded with 1.8 words on average, compared to 14.8 
words among persons sent the promising message, and 7.6 words among those sent the ambiguous 
message. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Using an Anova alone, it is impossible to determine which pair of means differ. Therefore, we turned 
to the Tukey Pairwise Comparison test, which is a post-hoc test used in analysis of variance. Results 
reported in table 6 show there is not a statistically significant difference in the number of words used 
in the immediate responses between the deterrent message group and the ambiguous group (p = 0.56), 
or between the latter and the group that received the promising message (p = 0.41). We do, though, 
observe a marginally significant difference in the mean number of words used between the deterrent 
and promising group (p = 0.06), indicating that the marginally significant results (see Tables 4 and 5) 
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are driven by differences between the groups that received the deterrent message and the promising 
message.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Exploratory Analysis
To better understand our data and, by extension, romance fraudsters, we conducted an exploratory 
analysis of responses. Recall that 65 persons replied to our messages. First, we qualitatively coded 
each person’s textual message. These data are not large (~3,500 words), so we analyzed this content 
within a Microsoft Word document, rather than use a qualitative software package (e.g., NVivo).
We organized qualitative data into relatively unambiguous themes, or categories, reflective of our 
research foci. The most important emergent themes are unambiguous denial and a desire to continue 
interaction. The first of those was less prominent. Across the 65 responses, it was evident in 7 (11%) 
cases. This sort of reply was only sent by persons in the deterrent group. We received a total of 13 
responses from people in this group, so a little more than half of them replied with unambiguous 
denial. Here are unedited examples:
Deterrence Group, Respondent 2: I see you are joking.
Deterrence Group, Respondent 3: Hello! I think you just wrote the wrong person  This email 
was hacked several months ago and I’m glad I got it back so whatever has been done with this 
email I’m not liable for any damage and I’m sorry if you fell victim one way or the other. Lately 
I’ve been getting strange mails from strange people and it’s really annoying. I already made a 
report so and you can do the same as well.
Deterrence Group, Respondent 9: Hu, I am not a scammer.
Deterrence Group, Respondent 13: I do not know who are you and where you get my mail... I do 
not understand your intentions and "warnings"! But i know for 100% that i can put you in prison 
for defamation! So, watch your words and have a happy life!
The additional three denials also display the more prominent theme across cases, namely a desire to 
continue interaction. The responders request more information about the accusation, which they deny:
Deterrence Group, Respondent 4: HHello  oh  I’m very happy to see your letter !!! My mood is 
right up !!! Honey ... what are you talking about ??? I wrote to you to meet you dear! But what 
have I done wrong to you ??
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Deterrence Group, Respondent 6: Hello! I don’t know who you are, and why you decided that I 
was deceiving someone! What do you want from me, and where did you get my email address?
Deterrence Group, Respondent 8: What?  Do you think I am scamming people? No wrong.  It's 
more like I'm being scammed.
The other responses that seek further communication do not explicitly deny wrongdoing. These were 
found across members from all three groups. The responses often posed requests for more 
information about the sender, either in the form of a question or statement:
Ambiguous Group, Respondent 2: I wish to get to know you. I am new to social networks. And I 
was at dating agency. The agency gave me your email. Now I will tell you a little about myself. My 
name is Anna. I am38 years old. I am from Russia. I've never been married, and I have no 
children. At the moment, I feel lonely. I really want to have a serious relationship. I want to get 
know you better. I hope you do not forget to write me.
Ambiguous Group, Respondent 3: Hello who are you[?]
Ambiguous Group, Respondent 11: Hi, I am live this site u come fast
Ambiguous Group, Respondent 19: Hi, how are you doing today?
Deterrence Group, Respondent 1: who is this please?
Deterrence Group, Respondent 7: what are you talking about?
Promising Group, Respondent 4: You saw my pictures where?
Promising Group, Respondent 5: Of course, you can! Happy Weekend. Drop me a number I can 
text you on. Cheers. Angela
Promising Group, Respondent 12: Hi, Do we know each other?
The other major theme is, in some respects, not a theme at all: ambiguous responses. Seven replies 
were coded as such, accounting for 11% of all replies. In the deterrent group, respondent 2 wrote “you 
crying.” In the ambiguous group, respondent 25 replied “lol funny.” And in the ambiguous, which 
recall received the “Hi” message, 5 respondents (#s 4, 13, 15, 23, and 24) replied with “Hi,” “Hey,” or 
“HEY.” Though something like “hi” is plausibly interpretable as seeking further interaction, it is more 
conservative to code as ambiguous.
Hypothesis 3
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Finally, we used our qualitative findings to construct a final hypothesis suitable for testing: Romance 
fraudsters who receive and respond to a deterrence messages, instead of non-deterrence messages, 
have a lower probability of seeking a reply without denying wrongdoing.
We conducted a chi-square test of independence. Results, as presented in Table 7, demonstrate that 
fraudsters who receive a deterrent message are less likely to do so, x2 = 15.39, p = 0.000. Specifically, 
38% of those who received the deterrent message sought a reply without denying wrongdoing in 
comparison to 88% of those who received other types of messages. Thus, we find support for the 
hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
From the analysis presented in Table 7, it is unclear if the two non-deterrent messages skewed the 
results. Therefore, we again separately examine each of the three groups using a chi-square test of 
independence. Results indicate there are significant differences in the rate of seeking reply between 
the three groups, x2 =17.66, p = 0.000. Whereas romance fraudsters who received the deterrent 
message only sought a reply without denying wrongdoing 38% of the time, those who received the 
ambiguous message did so at a rate of 79%, and those who were sent the promising message at a rate 
of 96%. Again, this finding supports our third hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Cybercrime will continue to increase as society becomes more reliant on computers and networked 
devices. Thus, so too will romance fraud. Research has examined its impact on victims and detailed its 
methods of execution. Less scholarship focuses on whether, and how, to mitigate romance fraud. To 
build an evidence-base in this area, we tested three hypotheses: Romance fraudsters who receive a 
deterrence message, instead of non-deterrence messages, (H1) respond at a lower rate; (H2) among 
those who respond, use fewer words in their immediate responses, and (H3) less often seek a reply 
without denying wrongdoing.
Our results show that romance fraudsters can be restrictively deterred (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 1996). In 
other words, threatening them with sanction leads them to reduce the extent of their offending. We 
found that romance fraudsters who were sent a deterrence message, instead of a promising or 
ambiguous message, less often replied; used fewer words in their replies; and, less often replied 
without denying wrongdoing. Those findings lend support to the validity of restrictive deterrent 
theory. Our study also serves as an example of how to test restrictive deterrence in cyberspace. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to directly send deterrence cues to active offenders and examine 
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their responses. In doing so, we present additional evidence that cyber-offenders are rational decision-
makers.
Furthermore, the results speak to the utility of a proactive approach to mitigating romance fraud, and 
cybercrime more broadly. It is clear that once they are committed, law enforcement agencies are 
largely unable to do much about them (Burruss et.al, 2019). It is rational, then, to reallocate resources 
from responding to preventing cybercrimes. Our findings add to the growing evidence-based for 
deterring and otherwise nudging offenders, analog and cyber, to commit fewer and lesser serious 
offenses (Maimon et.al, 2014). How to take advantage of this effect is an open question. With respect 
to romance fraud, the purveyors of dating platforms could develop an algorithm that identifies the 
likely offenders, and then send them automated but realistic deterrence messages, lest they pass a 
screening protocol. Potentially, that approach could be used with other fraudsters, too, such as those 
involved in the sale of counterfeit goods.
The results and their implications should be considered in light of our study’s limitations, which future 
research should address. The first issue was mentioned in the method section: We do not know if two 
or more email addresses are controlled by the same real individual. To the extent that is the case, the 
validity of our findings is undermined due to contamination. Second, some of the email addresses that 
we messaged may have been inappropriately listed on the website that we used to collect them, which 
would undermine the validity of our findings. The same could also result if, third, romance fraudsters 
rarely receive messages like those we sent. Fourth, and finally, the generalizability of our results is 
unknown. For instance, the results may not apply to male personas, as the website we used to obtain 
email addresses was limited to female personas. Likewise, it is unknown whether and how the results 
would differ for research using different messages, websites or apps.
In conclusion, and the limitations notwithstanding, this article has shown that deterrent messages 
alter the behavior of online romance fraudsters. As such, the findings support and expand on the 
restrictive deterrence perspective (Gibbs, 1975), while providing a potential avenue for proactive 
mitigation strategies. We also provide additional evidence supporting the assumption of rationality 
and decision-making among cyber-offenders. As time progresses, technological advancements 
continually change the cyber landscape. Human behavior, however, remains constant. Therefore, to 
ensure a safer cyberspace requires research into the human-factor in cybercrime.
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